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I. INTRODUCTION
In the mid-2000s, the world sat front-row as Britney Spears’s infamous
downward spiral unraveled.1 Her many notorious antics included attacking a car
with an umbrella and driving with her baby in her lap as she sped away from
paparazzi.2 However, no moment seemed to signify she had hit rock bottom more

* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2021; M.A.
Environmental Policy and Planning, California State University, Chico, 2013. I would like to thank my family
and friends for their loving support during law school, and a special acknowledgment to my mother-in-law who
introduced me to this topic and provided invaluable support along the way. Thank you to Professor Melissa Brown
for serving as my faculty advisor and thank you to the editorial staff for the endless advice and guidance.
1. Stephanie Marcus, 10 Years Later, Britney Spears’ Head-Shaving Moment is Still Unforgettable,
HUFFPOST (Feb. 17, 2017, 8:50 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/britney-spears-shaved-her-head-tenyears-ago_n_58a5cff6e4b07602ad525d50 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
2.
Id.; Spears: Baby Driving Incident “a Mistake,” BILLBOARD (Feb. 10, 2016),
https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/59724/spears-baby-driving-incident-a-mistake (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
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than when she walked into a hair salon in 2007 and shaved her head completely
bald.3 To a judge, these unusual acts demonstrated Britney Spears’s mental
incompetence to manage her career and finances. 4 As a result, the court appointed
both her father and attorney as co-conservators of her estate. 5 This meant they
controlled her finances by collecting her income, paying her bills, and managing
her investments.6
For over a decade, the two co-conservators managed her finances while her
estate paid for their services.7 If someone opposed how they managed her estate,
the estate would pay for the litigation. 8 This is because the current California
Probate Code allows attorneys to collect their fees through the conservatee’s
estate—in this case, Britney Spears’s estate—regardless of who wins or loses.9 For
someone like Britney Spears, and the affluent in general, attorney fees are
insignificant in terms of their overall wealth.10 However, many conservatees
cannot afford the attorney fees of feuding parties. 11

3. Marcus, supra note 1.
4. See id. (detailing a series of events that led to Britney losing her freedom and a judge awarding a
conservatorship of her estate).
5. Melody Chiu, Britney Spears’ Dad Jamie Asks to Step Down as Conservator After Alleged Altercation
with Her Son, PEOPLE (Sept. 6, 2019, 3:05 PM), https://people.com/music/britney-spears-dad-temporarily-stepsdown-conservator/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); Laura Newberry, Britney Spears
Hasn’t Fully Controlled Her Life for Years. Fans Insist It’s Time to #FreeBritney, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2019,
10:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-17/britney-spears-conservatorship-free-britney
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
6. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., HANDBOOK FOR CONSERVATORS, at 1-3 (rev. ed. 2016),
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/handbook.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(detailing the role of a conservator is to step into the shoes of the conservatee and manage the income, pay bills,
etc. as the conservatee would have had she not lacked the requisite capacity to do so).
7. See Chiu, supra note 5 (noting that Britney’s father was appointed conservator in 2008 and is now, in
2019, requesting of the court to remove him as conservator); see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 2641(a)–(b) (West
2019) (explaining that the conservator can be compensated for the services rendered while acting in the capacity
of the conservator).
8. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 2623(b) (West 2019) (explaining that the conservatee’s estate should not
compensate the conservator’s attorney fees unless the court determines that the conservator opposed the objection
in good faith and in the best interest of the conservatee).
9. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 2640(d) (West 2019) (noting that the conservatee’s estates does not pay the
conservator’s attorney fees for unsuccessfully opposing a petition unless the court determines that the opposition
was made in good faith and in the best interest of the conservatee); see also Newberry, supra note 5 (noting that
Britney Spear’s father, Jamie Spears, filed for temporary conservatorship in Los Angeles County Superior Court
in 2008, which became permanent later that year, meaning that the conservatorship is subject to California law,
especially the California Probate Code).
10. See Allison Schonter, Britney Spears’ Net Worth Revealed in Court Documents, POPCULTURE.COM
(Aug. 13, 2019, 11:11 PM), https://popculture.com/celebrity/2019/08/13/britney-spears-net-worth-revealedcourt-documents/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (revealing Britney Spears’s net worth
of $59 million).
11. See Interview with Elizabeth A. Ikemire, Attorney, Law Office of Elizabeth A. Ikemire, in Sacramento,
Cal. (Sept. 13, 2019) (notes on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that the attorney’s fees
add up quickly when family members fight, which results in very little left over for the aging parent who relies
on the money for caregiving expenses).

964

University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 52
Take for instance the real-life case of Mother Doe (“Doe”). 12 Doe is healthy
and expected to live for many years, although she is often forgetful and requires
caregiving assistance for which her estate pays. 13 Her daughter, Darla, quit her job
and moved in with Doe to provide the caregiving assistance her mother requires. 14
While some children may have done this for free, Darla did not. 15 Instead, Doe
paid Darla for the caregiving services rather than a third-party caregiver. 16 After a
few years, Darla managed to spend nearly $200,000 of her mother’s money.17
When Doe’s son, Steve, learned of his sister’s spending behavior, he hired an
attorney to petition the court to place Doe in a conservatorship and appoint him as
the conservator.18 Darla, in return, hired her own attorney to object to Steve’s
petition to become conservator.19 Additionally, the court appointed an attorney to
represent Doe and her interests in the lawsuit. 20 In total, there were three attorneys
representing three different parties on one conservatorship matter, all of whom
Doe’s estate will pay when the parties resolve the case. 21
A year has passed since the initial filing of the case, and the feuding brother
and sister have not reached an agreement.22 Instead, the brother and sister continue
to quarrel while the attorney fees increase. 23 Meanwhile, the amount of money
remaining in Doe’s estate for her caregiving expenses continues to dwindle with
each day the parties fail to reach an agreement. 24
In California, the conservatee’s estate pays the litigation fees if the attorney
can prove she did her work in good faith.25 Additionally, she must prove her work
was “just and reasonable” under the circumstances and in the best interest of the
conservatee.26 There is a set of factors that help guide courts with determining

12. See id. (detailing the events from an actual conservatorship case being heard in the Sacramento County
Probate Court; the names of the parties to the lawsuit and minor facts have been changed to maintain
confidentiality).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Ikemire, supra note 11.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Ikemire, supra note 11.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 2641(c) (West 2019) (stating that the conservator is not compensated for
unsuccessfully opposing a petition “unless the court determines that the opposition was made in good faith, based
on the best interests of the ward or conservatee”).
26. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 2653(c)(1) (West 2019) (awarding attorney’s fees to the petitioner if the court
removes the conservator); Marc Alexander & William M. Hensley, Conservatorship Attorney’s Fees: Comply
with California Rules of Court or Suffer the Consequences, CAL. ATT’Y’S FEES (Aug. 21, 2008),
https://www.calattorneysfees.com/2008/08/conservatorship.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review).
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whether to award compensation; however, more often than not, the court awards
the fees.27 This might be because courts “struggle to evaluate competing claims of
siblings and have a limited attention span to parse through them.”28 Unfortunately,
family feuds will continue, and, if “siblings cannot find middle ground,” the
conservatee’s estate “end[s] up in the hands of a third party conservator . . . after
many thousands of dollars in legal fees.” 29 Mother Doe’s predicament is a perfect
example of this.30 While Doe’s estate continues to shrink, this question still looms:
was this family feud between brother and sister really in the best interest of their
mother?31
This Comment examines the current California Probate Code and the
California Rules of Court and proposes an amendment that limits the
circumstances under which the conservatee’s estate pays attorney fees. 32 The
amendment underscores the idea that the conservatee’s estate is no longer
responsible for paying all attorney fees in a disputed conservatorship case.33
Part II of this Comment explores conservatorships generally and lays the
foundation for their purpose, benefits, and pitfalls. 34 To better understand the
events that led to the current law, Part III details the most recent overhaul of
California’s Probate Code with the Omnibus Conservatorship and Guardianship
Reform Act of 2006.35 Part IV provides insight into why judges award attorney
fees by exploring the case law that led to the current interpretation of “just and
reasonable,” as well as the California Rules of Court’s “reasonableness” factors. 36
Lastly, Part V presents a proposed model rule that reflects the amendment to
California’s existing law.37

27. See CAL. RULE OF CT. 7.756 (West 2019) (listing a multitude of non-exhaustive factors for the court
to consider when determining whether the award compensation); Ikemire, supra note 11.
28. Jeffrey S. Galvin, Parent Custody Battles Leave Everyone Bruised, DOWNEY BRAND (June 27, 2016),
https://www.trustontrial.com/2016/06/parent-custody-battles-leave-everyone-bruised/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
29. Id.
30. See Ikemire, supra note 11 (noting that after a year of litigation, the brother and sister have not found
common ground, but instead, they continue waste their mother’s money as the fight to control her and her estate).
31. Id.
32. Infra Parts III–V.
33. Infra Part V.
34. Infra Part II.
35. Infra Part III.
36. Infra Part IV.
37. Infra Part V.
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II. CONSERVATORSHIPS
Not all conservatorships are bad.38 They serve an important role in American
society because they allow an individual to legally make decisions on behalf of
another who cannot make the decision for herself, either because of a physical or
psychological impairment.39 Allowing attorneys to collect their fees from the
conservatee’s estate should encourage, rather than discourage, someone from
filing a petition with the court for the appropriate reasons. 40 If Darla was truly
swindling Doe, the notion of attorney fees should not discourage Steven from filing
a conservatorship petition, even if he does not have money to pay the attorney up
front.41 The same should be true for any vulnerable parent who might be
susceptible to phone scammers or greedy family members. 42 The purpose of the
conservatorship is to fight to protect the conservatee’s interests rather than to gain
control over the conservatee. 43 As a result, there is a delicate balance between
preserving court accessibility and safeguarding the conservatee. 44 Any amendment
to the probate code or rules of court must reflect this delicate balance. 45
This Part further explores the functions of a conservatorship. 46 Section A
distinguishes the role of a conservator from that of the conservatee to delineate the
significantly different legal functions of each. 47 Section B compares and contrasts
the characteristics of a conservatorship with a guardianship and the role those
characteristics serve in this Comment.48 Section C provides insight into the
conservatorship process in California by illustrating the legal procedure from
beginning to end.49 Section D concludes with a brief look at the conflict between
conservatorships and core principles of American Jurisprudence. 50

38. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 6, at 1-3 (detailing the role of a conservator is to step into
the shoes of the conservatee and manage the income, pay bills, etc. so that the conservatee can continue to live
her life without hiccup).
39. See id. (detailing the role of a conservator is to step into the shoes of the conservatee to make financial
decisions for the conservatee because the conservatee cannot).
40. See Ikemire, supra note 11 (explaining that legal fees should not deter someone from filing a petition
for conservatorship if a loved truly required a conservatorship to protect them from financial abuse).
41. See id. (explaining that legal fees should not the son from filing a conservatorship petition if he truly
believed that his sister was stealing money from their mother).
42. See id. (explaining that legal fees should not deter someone from filing a petition for conservatorship
if a loved truly required a conservatorship to protect them from financial abuse).
43. Interview with Jeffrey S. Galvin, Attorney, Downey Brand, in Sacramento, Cal. (Jan. 10, 2020) (notes
on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
44. See id. (noting that any amendment to the probate code or rules of court should not discourage an
interested party from filing a claim to protect and safeguard a parent’s interests).
45. Id.
46. Infra Part II.
47. Infra Section II.A.
48. Infra Section II.B.
49. Infra Section II.C.
50. Infra Section II.D.
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A. The Role of the Conservator vs. the Conservatee
A conservatorship is a court proceeding whereby a judge appoints a
responsible party to care for and manage the affairs of another individual. 51 “The
person appointed is called the ‘conservator,’ and the person who the conservator
looks after is called the ‘conservatee.’” 52 A conservator is often a court-appointed
individual or organization who safeguards and manages the financial affairs and/or
personal care needs of a person who a judge or jury determined is unfit to manage
her own affairs. 53 Conservators often are a spouse, son, daughter, parent, relative,
public guardian, or even a professional fiduciary. 54 The court entrusts the
conservator with significant responsibility because she makes decisions on behalf
of the conservatee as though she is the conservatee. 55 The conservator’s goal is to
help the conservatee live their best life possible for however long the conservatee
lives or for the length of the conservatorship.56
Conservatees are often elderly or infirm.57 However, Britney Spears’s
conservatorship serves as evidence that even young adults sometimes need
financial assistance and caregiving oversight.58 Thus, conservatees range in age
because people of all ages can lack the mental or physical ability to manage their
own affairs.59
There is a legal distinction between a conservator of a person versus a
conservator of an estate. 60 When a court appoints a conservator of a person, the
conservator has a legal duty to manage the conservatee’s personal needs, such as
living arrangements, transportation, food, clothing, and health care appointments.61
“A conservator of [a] person can make sure the conservatee takes his or her
medication and discourage interaction with individuals who promote selfdestructive behavior . . . [whereas a] conservator of [an] estate can ensure that the
conservatee is protected from third parties seeking to financially exploit the
51. Karina Stanhope, “Stronger” Now – California Conservatorships Can Provide a Helping Hand to
Young Adults, DOWNEY BRAND (May 30, 2016), https://www.trustontrial.com/2016/05/stronger-now-californiaconservatorships-can-provide-a-helping-hand-to-young-adults/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review).
52. Id.
53. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 6, at 1-1.
54. Id. at 1-2.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1-1.
57. Stanhope, supra note 51.
58. See Newberry, supra note 5 (noting that the conservatorship of Britney Spears and her estate was filed
in
2008);
see
also
Britney
Spears
Biography,
BIOGRAPHY
(Nov.
14,
2019),
https://www.biography.com/musician/britney-spears (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(showing that Britney Spears was born in 1981 and would therefore have been roughly twenty-seven years of
age); Stanhope, supra note 51.
59. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 6, at 1-1.
60. Stanhope, supra note 51.
61. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 6, at 1-2 to 1-3.
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conservatee.”62 When a court appoints a conservator of an estate, the conservator
is responsible for the conservatee’s financial affairs, such as collecting the
conservatee’s income, paying their bills, and investing their assets. 63 The
conservator also has the legal discretion to spend the estate’s funds for the benefit
of the conservatee’s family.64
It is worth noting, however, that not all spending lacks scrutiny.65 The
conservator must obtain court approval in certain situations and submit an
accounting of all income and expenses to the court for review after the first year
of the conservatorship and biennially thereafter.66 The accounting provides a
financial picture of whether the conservator is using and investing the
conservatee’s assets appropriately.67 The court file examiner may require the
conservator to further explain the appropriateness of an expense if evidence
suggests the conservator misused the conservatee’s funds.68 If the conservator
cannot justify the expenses, the court might surcharge the conservator, meaning
the conservator must pay back any inappropriate expense. 69
B. Conservatorships vs. Guardianships
In California, a conservatorship refers to the court appointment of an
individual to manage the affairs of an incapacitated adult—whether it is over a
person, a person’s estate, or both.70 A guardianship is the court appointment of an
individual to manage the affairs of a minor. 71 There are “many states [that] use the
term ‘guardianship’ instead of ‘conservatorship’ when referring to the same duties
for adults,” which means that what might classify as a conservatorship in
California is actually a guardianship in another state, or vice versa. 72 Some state
courts grant guardianships to allow a guardian to make health-related decisions for
an incapacitated person.73 However, in those same states, a court grants a
62. Stanhope, supra note 51.
63. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 6, at 1-3
64. Id. at 5-9.
65. See id. at 5-44 (describing how the conservator must obtain court approval for certain activities such
as investments, selling the home, selling or borrowing assets, etc.); Ikemire, supra note 11.
66. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 6, at 1-2, 5-44 (describing how the conservator must obtain
court approval for certain activities such as investments, selling the home, selling or borrowing assets, etc.);
Ikemire, supra note 11.
67. Ikemire, supra note 11.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Michael Gilfix et al., The Difference Between Conservatorship and Guardianship in California, GILFIX
& LA POLL ASSOCIATES LLP: ESTATE PLANNING BLOG (May 13, 2016), https://www.gilfix.com/2016/05/thedifference-between-conservatorship-and-guardianship-in-california/ (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. What is the Difference Between Conservatorship and Guardianship?, MOTLEY FOOL (Oct. 17, 2016),
https://www.fool.com/knowledge-center/what-is-the-difference-between-conservatorship-and.aspx (on file with
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conservatorship to allow a conservator to make financially related decisions on
behalf of an incapacitated person.74
While this Comment explores the intricacies of conservatorships and
guardianships in other states to help shape a proposed model rule, the model rule
presented applies only to California conservatorships. 75 Therefore, unless
otherwise noted, the term “conservatorship” used throughout this Comment refers
to California conservatorships. 76
C. Insight Into the Conservatorship Process in California
The conservatorship process begins when an interested party files a petition in
a California Superior Court requesting a conservatorship of a person, a person’s
estate, or both.77 The petitioner can request to appoint herself as the conservator,
or she may request to appoint a private fiduciary, a family friend, or relative. 78
When submitting the petition, the petitioner must establish the need for a
conservatorship with clear and convincing evidence. 79 This threshold requirement
often causes the petitioner to exaggerate the conservatee’s condition to convince
the court that the conservatee is in dire need of an immediate conservatorship.80
However, the court does not rely solely on the petition when making its
determination.81 The court also reviews the Capacity Declaration to decide whether
a conservatorship is necessary.82 A Capacity Declaration provides a “complete
medical overview of the proposed conservatee,” which the petitioner must include
with the initial filing documents.83 The conservatee’s physician completes this
form, rather than the petitioner, which restrains the court form imposing a
conservatorship based solely on any exaggerated conditions pled in the initial
filing.84
The conservatee’s physician conducts a medical examination to measure the

the University of the Pacific Law Review).
74. Id.
75. Infra Parts II–V.
76. Infra Parts II–V.
77. Jeffrey S. Galvin, The Uncertain Role of Court Appointed Counsel in California Conservatorship
Cases, DOWNEY BRAND (May 20, 2019), https://www.trustontrial.com/2019/05/the-uncertain-role-of-courtappointed-counsel-in-california-conservatorship-cases/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Ikemire, supra note 11.
81. Id.
82. Id.; Anette Gomez, What is a Capacity Declaration in a California Probate Case?, JUST DOCUMENT
PREPARATION, https://justdocprep.com/what-is-a-capacity-declaration-in-a-california-probate-case/ (last visited
Apr. 11, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
83. Gomez, supra note 82; see Ikemire, supra note 11 (explaining how the medical form acts as a safeguard
to a court authorizing conservatorship petitions based solely on the alleged facts in the petition).
84. Ikemire, supra note 11.
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conservatee’s mental capabilities. 85 The physician assesses the conservatee’s
alertness, ability to process information, memory, logical reasoning, general mood,
and other cognitive faculties. 86 For each category, the physician indicates whether
there is no impairment, moderate to major impairment, or even whether the
conservatee is so impaired that the physician cannot conduct an assessment. 87 This
information is invaluable to the court because it helps it to determine whether the
conservatee requires a conservatorship or not.88
The court clerk sets an initial hearing date once the petitioner files the case in
the respective superior court, at which point the petitioner gives notice to the
conservatee’s close family members.89 A judge may appoint counsel for the
proposed conservatee in select cases under California Probate Code §§ 1470–
1471.90 The court-appointed counsel is not the same attorney representing the
petitioner, but rather, is an attorney selected from a rotating list of attorneys “who
have volunteered to serve as court-appointed counsel.”91 The court-appointed
counselor meets with the conservatee, reviews the petition and any other pleadings
on file, and speaks with any interested family members and/or their attorneys. 92
The role of the court-appointed counselor is to represent the conservatee and
her wishes rather than what the counselor believes is best for the conservatee,
which is reflected in a report the counselor submits to the court. 93 For example, the
conservatee may not want to be placed in a conservatorship. 94 The court-appointed
counselor—who the court appointed to zealously represent the conservatee—must
then request for the court to not impose a conservatorship even if the conservatee
truly needs one.95 Therefore, while it may appear that the court-appointed
counselor is a neutral third party who could report candidly to the court regarding
whether a conservatorship is necessary—or whether the real issue is the result of a
rivalry between siblings rather than mom’s mental capacity—the counselor is
bound by ethical duties to represent the client and not her best interest.96
“Meanwhile, the court’s probate investigator conducts a limited investigation and
reports on the propriety of the conservatorship.”97 The investigator examines the
conservatee’s living arrangements, quality of care, financial situation, and physical
85. Gomez, supra note 82.
86. CAL. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, FORM NO. GC-335, CAPACITY DECLARATION–CONSERVATORSHIPS (2019),
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/gc335.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
87. Id.
88. Gomez, supra note 82.
89. Galvin, supra note 77.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.; Ikemire, supra note 11.
95. Galvin, supra note 77; Ikemire, supra note 11.
96. See Galvin, supra note 77 (“California law generally imposes duties of confidentiality and loyalty on
attorneys without any express exception for those appointed to represent proposed conservatees.”).
97. Id.
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and mental treatment. 98 The investigator submits a report to the court for it to
consider when weighing whether to grant or revoke the conservatorship.99
D. Conservatorships vs. Core Principles of American Jurisprudence
American society values individuals controlling their own lives and making
decisions without governmental or societal intrusion.100 This concept is known as
self-determination.101 The definition of “self-determination” is a person possessing
the legal right to determine her own fate by choosing how she wishes to live her
life.102 It is not only a core principle of international law, but also a principle of
American jurisprudence.103 Conservatorships, however, violate this core principle
because they strip a conservatee of her decision-making rights.104 A
conservatorship can strip the conservatee of her basic freedom to contract or
associate with whoever she wishes.105 The conservator now makes these
decisions.106
Conservatorships can cause and have caused conservatee’s to suffer at the
hands of the conservator because the conservator controls the conservatee’s fate. 107

98.
SB
1716,
2006
Leg.,
2005–2006
Sess.
(Cal.
2006),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=200520060SB1716 (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
99. Id.
100.
See Legal Info. Inst., Self-Determination (International Law), CORNELL L. SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/self_determination_%28international_law%29 (last visited Jan. 3, 2020) (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (inferring that self-determination is a core principle of
American law—not just international law); see also Self-Determination, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/self-determination (last visited Jan. 3, 2020) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining self-determination as the “free choice of one’s own acts or states
without external compulsion”).
101. See Self-Determination, supra note 100 (defining self-determination as the “free choice of one’s
own”).
102. See Legal Info. Inst., supra note 100 (denoting self-determination as “the legal right of people to
decide their own destiny in the international order”); see also Self-Determination, supra note 100 (defining selfdetermination as the “free choice of one’s own acts or states without external compulsion”).
103. Legal Info. Inst., supra note 100.
104. Principles: Conservatorship of Persons with Disabilities, DISABILITY RTS. CAL. (Mar. 24, 2017),
https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/legislation/principles-conservatorship-of-persons-with-disabilities (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
105. Stanhope, supra note 51.
106. See id. (explaining how a conservator is a person appointed to manage the affairs of another adult,
including making the conservatee take medication, deciding who they s.cialize with, and protect them from third
parties).
107. See Infra Part III (detailing the financial abuse many conservatees suffered at the hands of the
conservator prior to legislative reform); see generally Robin Fields et al., When a Family Matter Turns into a
Business, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2005), https://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-conserve13nov13-story.html (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (revealing specific conservatorship cases in which the
conservator abused her fiduciary duties and stole from the very people she was legally-bound to safeguard from
abuse).
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While a “conservatorship began as a way to help families protect enfeebled
relatives from predators and self-neglect,” they have become a way to “take basic
freedoms from grown men and women and give [those freedoms to]
conservators.”108 Conservators gain “sweeping power over [the conservatee’s]
property . . . money . . . and the smallest details of their lives.” 109 As a result, the
California Probate Code sets a high threshold for granting a conservatorship.110
The threshold requires that the conservatorship be the least restrictive alternative
required to protect the conservatee. 111 However, once the petitioner or proponent
of the conservatorship overcomes the burden of proof necessary to establish a
conservatorship, the conservatee is ripe for potential abuse because someone other
than the conservatee is choosing how she lives her life. 112
III. THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA: CALIFORNIA’S OMNIBUS
CONSERVATORSHIP AND GUARDIANSHIP REFORM ACT OF 2006
Prior to 2006, conservatorships were increasing in number, yet California
rarely regulated them.113 This area of law became a trade whereby professional
conservators “turn[ed] what had been a family matter into a business.” 114 While
conservatorships were intended to safeguard the elderly and infirm, this new breed
of conservator failed to uphold its legal duty by taking advantage of the
conservatee.115 This Part highlights the events that led to and the legal significance
of California’s Omnibus Conservatorship and Guardianship Reform Act of
2006.116 To provide an understanding of the reform’s significance, Section A
details stories of conservators exploiting the system.117 Section B tells the story of
one particular conservatorship that resonated with a California assembly member,
therefore influencing him to act.118 To shed light on what the Legislature intended
versus the law that it actually enacted, Section C concludes with a discussion of
the reform act’s legislative history.119

108. Fields et al., supra note 107.
109. Id.
110. Stanhope, supra note 51.
111. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1800.3 (West 2019); Stanhope, supra note 51; Principles: Conservatorship of
Persons with Disabilities, supra note 104.
112. Stanhope, supra note 51.
113. Fields et al., supra note 107.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Infra Part III.
117. Infra Section III.A.
118. Infra Section III.B.
119. Infra Section III.C.
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A. Exposing the Crimes
In 2005, the Los Angeles Times (“L.A. Times”) published a series of articles
exposing a new breed of conservators who abused their power.120 This new breed
employed questionable tactics to take advantage of vulnerable individuals to
control their wealth.121 The L.A. Times investigated the work of California’s
professional conservators and discovered that “seniors [could] lose their
independence with stunning swiftness”—sometimes without even knowing it.122
In one instance, a conservator stole money from an eighty-eight year-old
female conservatee and invested it in a restaurant belonging to the conservator’s
friend; the money was supposed to pay the conservatee’s taxes.123 In another
instance, a conservator sold a conservatee’s home to herself at a discount, which
the conservator’s daughter then resold for triple the price. 124 Conservators have
increased their earnings by running up their fees on miscellaneous tasks.125 For
instance, a conservator charged $170 in fees to deliver $49.93 worth in groceries
to the conservatee. 126 In another example, a conservator charged the conservatee’s
estate $1,700 to attend the conservatee’s funeral. 127
While these examples represent some of the more egregious cases, the reality
was that once a court appointed a conservator, it was difficult and expensive to
remove the conservator.128 Shortly after the L.A. Times published its findings, it
became evidence that California desperately needed to overhaul its
conservatorship laws. 129
B. The Rise of Reform
Emmeline Frey was a ninety-three year-old widow when the court discovered
her conservator misappropriated her finances. 130 The conservator entrusted her
own car-salesman-turned-overnight-investor son to invest $100,000 of

120. Fields et al., supra note 107.
121. Id.
122. See id. (detailing the story of Helen Jones, who at the time was an eighty-seven-year-old woman, who
became involved in a conservatorship when a private fiduciary petitioned the court to become Helen’s conservator
without ever meeting Helen; the court granted without ever interviewing Helen).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Fields et al., supra note 107.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Jack Leonard & Robin Fields, Gov. Signs Conservator Reform Bills, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2006),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2006-sep-28-me-conservator28-story.html (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review).
130. Id.
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Emmeline’s assets.131 Needless to say, Emmeline lost her $100,000 and died before
she could personally recoup any losses.132 Emmeline’s story, among many others
published in the L.A. Times exposé, encouraged former California Assemblyman
Dave Jones of Sacramento to write one of the four reform bills that later became
the California Omnibus Conservatorship and Guardianship Reform Act of 2006.133
The L.A. Times articles highlighted a very plausible fear that a conservator
could easily gain control over a person’s affairs, steal her money, and isolate the
conservatee from family members.134 The Legislature realized that the current
judicial system failed to provide the necessary oversight required to catch the
rampant abuse, so it pledged to correct the deficiencies. 135
The purpose of the reform bills were to “strengthen oversight of professional
conservators through a system of state licensure and also require greater
supervision of their work by the judges who appoint them.”136 Conservators would
be required to obtain a license through the Department of Consumer Affairs; the
judicial system would provide educational training and assistance for all
participants, including non-professionals, so that families would not be required to
consult a professional for help; and, the court would establish a watchdog to
investigate complaints and prevent abuse.137
Unfortunately, these articles were not the first attempt at exposing
conservators stealing from conservatees. 138 Similar scandals prompted reform, but
previous governors vetoed any reform legislation.139 This time around, however,
former Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger “heed[ed] calls to overhaul California’s
troubled conservatorship system” and signed the reform bills into law in the fall of
2006.140

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Hearing on AB 1363 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 2006 Leg., 2005–2006 Sess. 23 (Ca1. 2006) (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
136. Leonard & Fields, supra note 129.
137. Hearing on AB 1363 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 135.
138. See Leonard & Fields, supra note 129 (noting that “scandals involving thefts by conservators have
prompted sporadic efforts to increase regulation”).
139. See id. (noting that while there were previous “scandals” involving conservator theft of the
conservatee, “three previous government vetoed legislation aimed at reform”).
140. Id.
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C. The Legislative History Behind the Reform
The California Assembly introduced the first of four reformation bills in
January 2006.141 Three other bills followed in April 2006.142 Each bill underwent
a series of committee reviews before former Governor Schwarzenegger eventually
signed them into law.143 The report from the June 27, 2006 Senate Judiciary
Committee Analysis of Senate Bill 1363 noted that the committee held
informational hearings for the purpose of shedding light on the problems
surrounding the current conservatorship system in California. 144 The “major
complaint discussed at these informational hearings” involved the ongoing
litigation between the conservator—who family and friends suspected of
mismanaging the conservatee’s finances.145 This becomes a significant issue
because the court more often than not requires the conservatee’s estate to pay the
litigation fees for all attorneys involved in the dispute. 146 To put an end to this
practice, the bill aimed to prohibit the conservator and her attorney from receiving
any compensation for unsuccessfully opposing a petition, especially if the court
removed the conservator from her position for cause. 147 As such, the conservator
could not charge the conservatee’s estate for her litigation expenses and would be
personally liable to pay her attorney fees. 148
However, in a later report from the August 31, 2006 Assembly Committee
Analysis, the committee amended the language to provide that the conservator and
her attorney would not receive compensation for unsuccessfully opposing a
141. AB-1363 Omnibus Conservatorship and Guardianship Reform Act of 2006, CAL. LEGIS. INFO.,
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
142. See Hearing on AB 1363 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 135 (reporting pending related
legislation as the following: SB 1116, SB 1550, and SB 1716); see also SB-1116 Conservatorship, CAL. LEGIS.
INFO., http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=200520060SB1116 (last visited
Jan. 10, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that the first committee review
of the bill was April 26, 2006); SB-1550 Professional Fiduciaries Act, CAL. LEGIS. INFO.,
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=200520060SB1550 (last visited Jan. 10,
2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing that the first committee review of the bill
was also not until April 18, 2006); SB-1716 Conservatorships, CAL. LEGIS. INFO.,
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=200520060SB1716 (last visited Jan. 10,
2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing that the first committee review of the bill
was also not until April 26, 2006).
143. See SB-1116 Conservatorship, supra note 142 (showing SB 1116 undergoing series of both Senate
and Assembly Floor Analyses); see also SB-1550 Professional Fiduciaries Act, supra note 142 (showing SB 1550
undergoing a series of both Senate and Assembly Floor Analyses); SB-1716 Conservatorships, supra note 142
(showing SB 1716 undergoing a series of both Senate and Assembly Floor Analyses).
144. Hearing on AB 1363 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 135.
145. Id.
146. See Ikemire, supra note 11 (stating that there are oftentimes three attorneys involved, one for the
conservator, one for the petitioner, and on for the conservatee and that it is rare for a judge to no approve all of
the attorney fees involved).
147. Hearing on AB 1363 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 135.
148. Id.
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petition “without good cause.”149 This means the conservator and her attorney can
receive compensation for unsuccessfully opposing a petition so long as they
opposed the petition with good cause.150 Furthermore, the petitioner could only
recoup her litigation costs in an unsuccessful petition if the court found that she
filed the petition in the best interest of the conservatee. 151 As a result, the
conservatee could still end up paying the petitioner’s attorney fees even if the
petitioner lost, so long as the petitioner could prove she initially filed the claim in
the best interest of the conservatee. 152
In summary, while the Legislature intended to preserve the conservatee’s
financial assets by placing parameters on when to award compensation to a
conservator and/or petitioner, the existing law permits both parties to recoup their
expenses if either proves they acted in good faith and in the best interest of the
conservatee.153 The Legislature codified this language in numerous sections of the
California Probate Code; but what does it mean to act in the best interest of the
conservatee?154 The next Part further explores this idea by detailing that courts
have interpreted “the best interest of the conservatee” to mean that an attorney acts
in “good faith” and is “just and reasonable” under the circumstances.155
IV. INTERPRETING “GOOD FAITH” AND “REASONABLE” IN CONSERVATORSHIP
MATTERS
The terms “good faith” and “reasonable” are littered throughout the probate
code.156 The California Legislature and judicial system have provided a myriad of
interpretations of these terms over the years. 157 This Part explores these
interpretations, particularly as they relate to attorney fees in conservatorship
149. Concurrence in Senate Amendments, Analysis of AB 1363, at 1 (Ca1. 2006) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
150. Id.
151. Hearing on AB 1363 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 135.
152. See id. (inferring from the legislative history that it was the legislature’s intent to allow the petitioner
to receive reimbursement for her expenses, but “the court must find that the petition was filed in the best interest
of the conservatee”).
153. Compare id. (outlining the Legislature’s intent to prohibit conservators from receiving compensation
for unsuccessfully opposing a claim), with Concurrence in Senate Amendments, supra note 149 (noting the
additional language added in the final draft analysis that would allow the conservator to receive compensation if
the court believed she acted in good faith and in the best interest of the conservatee, even if she unsuccessfully
opposed the petition).
154. See generally CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2640–53 (West 2019) (noting the codification of the terms “good
faith” and “best interest of the conservatee” in the reformed law); Infra Part IV (interpreting “good faith” and
“reasonable” to mean the conservator considered the conservatee’s quality of care, financial well-being, and living
arrangements above all else).
155. Infra Part IV.
156. See generally PROB. §§ 2640–53 (noting the codification of the terms “good faith” and “best interest
of the conservatee” in the reformed law).
157. See Guardianship of Cookingham, 45 Cal. 2d. 367, 370 (1955) (detailing an example of how a court
has interpreted the terms to coincide with trust law, such that the duties owed are interpreted as being similar to
that of a trustee).
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matters.158 Underpinning this section is Probate Code § 2640(d), which provides
the following:
[T]he guardian or conservator shall not be compensated from the estate for
any costs or fees that the guardian or conservator incurred in
unsuccessfully opposing a petition, or other request or action, made by or
on behalf of the ward or conservatee, unless the court determines that the
opposition was made in good faith based on the interests of the ward or
conservatee.”159
Section A examines the case law to see how common law transformed the
California Probate Code, and conversely how the court system interpreted the
terms “good faith” and “reasonable.” 160 Section A also highlights the significance
of judicial discretion in fee compensation cases. 161 Section B narrowly considers
the case law surrounding the “reasonableness factors” that a judge considers when
determining whether to award fees.162
A. Case Review
California Probate Code § 2647 requires the court to approve both attorney
and conservatorship fees. 163 The conservator cannot pay herself, her attorney, or
opposing counsel without court approval.164 “If [the conservator] does not obtain
the court’s permission when it is required, she may be removed as conservator or
be required to reimburse the estate from her own personal funds, or both.”165 In
Conservatorship of Bower, the court noted that the Legislature enacted this code
section, as well as §§ 2640–2646, as a way to protect those who need a
conservatorship from people who will “treat [the conservatee’s] estate as blank
checks.”166
While the court must approve attorney fees in a conservatorship matter, there
is no concrete rule governing when to and when not to award these fees. 167
158. Infra Sections IV.A–B.
159. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2640(d) (West 2019).
160. Infra Section IV.A.
161. Infra Section IV.A.
162. Infra Section IV.B.
163. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2647 (West 2019); Conservatorship of Bower, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 307 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2016).
164. Conservatorship of Bower, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
165. Lawrence M. Friedman & June O. Starr, Losing It in California, Conservatorship and the Social
Organization of Aging, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1501, 1509 (1995).
166. Conservatorship of Bower, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
167. See generally CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2640–53 (West 2019) (noting that a court must use judicial
discretion when awarding or not awarding compensation, which the court weighs whether the conservator and
her attorney acted reasonably and in good faith).
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However, from a review of the case law in this area, is it evident that courts defer
to judicial discretion when awarding attorney fees. 168
When the law tasks courts with determining whether to award compensation,
a judge often looks to each party’s status and position in the case. 169 A judge may
look to whether the party seeking compensation was the petitioner or the
conservator, whether the party successfully petitioned for conservatorship, or
whether the party unsuccessfully opposed the petition for conservatorship.170
While many areas of law adopt the American Rule—which requires each side to
pay its respective attorney fees regardless of who wins the case—In re Moore’s
Estate established that a court can award compensation to an unsuccessful
petitioner.171 However, a court only awards compensation when the unsuccessful
petitioner initiated the proceeding in good faith. 172 Other courts adopted this
precedent, eventually influencing the Legislature to codify the caveat of “good
faith” into law.173
When determining the meaning of “good faith,” the California Supreme Court
in Guardianship of Cookingham established that a probate court must rely on
“equitable considerations relating to the law of trusts.”174 As evidenced in
Conservatorship of Lefkowitz, probate courts hold firm to this principle today.175
Lefkowitz is a prominent probate case and courts often cited to it when resolving
matters relating to fee compensation.176 Like Cookingham, the court in Lefkowitz
equated conservatorships to trust law.177 In the court’s analysis, it notes that while
a trustee may incur expenses, the law limits her right to reimbursement to “those
expenses which are reasonably necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes
of the trust.”178 The law does not entitle the trustee to indemnity if she incurs

168. See generally id. (noting that a court must use judicial discretion when awarding or not awarding
compensation, which the court weighs whether the conservator and her attorney acted reasonably and in good
faith); see, e.g., In re Jacobson’s Guardianship, 30 Cal.2d 312, 325 (1947) (noting that “the allowance of counsel
fees in a matter such as this rests largely in the discretion of the court in the first instance and the order under
review will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is plainly involved”); In re O’Conner’s Estate, 28 Cal.
App. 2d 527, 531 (1938) (stating “that such allowances always rest in the discretion of the trial court”); In re
Clanton’s Estate and Guardianship, 171 Cal. 381, 387 (1915) (noting that “allowance of attorney’s fees to
guardian incurred in settlement of final account is within the court’s discretion”).
169. Conservatorship of Lefkowitz, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1310, 1313 (1996).
170. Id. at 1315–16.
171.
Will
Kenton,
American
Rule,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Sept.
24,
2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/american-rule.asp (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review);
In re Moore’s Estate, 258 Cal. App. 2d 458, 461 (1968).
172. In re Moore’s Estate, 258 Cal. App. 2d at 461.
173. See generally CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2640–53 (West 2019) (noting the use of “good faith” throughout
the code sections).
174. Guardianship of Cookingham, 45 Cal. 2d. 367, 370 (1955).
175. Conservatorship of Lefkowitz, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1310, 1314 (1996).
176. Edward J. Corey, Jr., Margaret G. Lodise & Peter S. Stern, Crisis in Conservatorships, 12 CAL. TR.
& EST. Q. 43 (2007).
177. Conservatorship of Lefkowitz, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1314.
178. Id.
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expenses beyond what would benefit the trust estate. 179
The court is ultimately guided by the underlying principle that any fees
incurred—whether the trustee’s fees or the attorney fees—must reasonably benefit
the trust for the court to award compensation.180 Additionally, the trustee’s
decision to accrue such fees must be “properly motivated,” meaning that the trustee
acted with a good faith belief her action would benefit the trust.181 In summary, “a
trustee may not be indemnified for an expense unless the trustee subjectively
believed that the expense was necessary or appropriate to carry out the purpose of
the trust and that belief was objectively reasonable.” 182
In this context, the term “trustee” is akin to the term “conservator” because the
expectation is the same for both.183 The court in Lefkowitz requires the conservator
to advance the interests of the conservatee much like the obligation of the trustee
to advance the trust’s interests. 184 Thus, “a conservator is bound to act with
reasonable prudence and pursuant to a good-faith belief that its actions will tend to
accomplish the purpose of its trust by benefiting the conservatee.” 185 The notion of
“good faith” is so essential to a court’s decision that the court in Conservatorship
of Cornelius authorized attorney fees simply because a party filed a petition in
good faith even though the court never established the conservatorship. 186 The
mere fact that a daughter petitioned the court with a good faith belief that her father
needed a conservatorship was enough for the court to award her compensation,
regardless of the fact that the court never imposed a conservatorship on the
father.187
Conversely, the court in Lefkowitz reduced both the attorney and conservator’s
fees because self-interest motivated the conservator.188 The conservator in
Lefkowitz opposed a petition for her removal.189 She did not oppose the court
replacing her with a successor trustee, but rather she opposed the manner in which
the court would have removed her. 190 It was her practice to step down as
conservator when a willing family member expressed a desire to become the

179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Conservatorship of Lefkowitz, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1313–14.
184. Id. at 1314.
185. Id.
186. Conservatorship of Cornelius, 200 Cal. App. 4th 1198, 1200 (2011).
187. See id. at 1205 (“petition[ing] to appoint a permanent conservator, and appointment of a temporary
conservatory pending resolution of that petition, may well benefit the conservatee even if a permanent
conservatorship is never established”; further, there was evidence to support that Cornelius benefitted from the
temporary conservatorship, though not a permanent one, so the court awarded the daughter attorney fees).
188. Conservatorship of Lefkowitz, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1316.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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conservator.191 She would step down without a court ordering her to do so.192
However, the fact that a family member did petition the court for her removal
caused her to become defensive, and so she objected to her removal. 193
Consequently, the court believed that her self-interest and not the interest of the
conservatee motivated her decision to oppose the petition.194 She let her ego and
reputation as a professional conservator guide her decision, which the court
deemed was incompatible with “good faith” because it harmed the conservatee’s
interest.195 In the end, the court reduced the amount of fees her and her attorney
could collect from the conservatee’s estate. 196
Other courts have held that “good faith” exists when the petition provides
substantial evidence supporting the need for a conservatorship. 197 Examples of
substantial evidence include declarations from family members confirming the
“conservatee’s compromised physical and mental state and susceptibility to
fraud”; a capacity declaration from a physician detailing a concern for the
conservatee’s judgment; reports from the court-appointed investigator who
concludes that the conservatee is emotionally and financially ripe for abuse; and a
report from the conservatee’s court-appointed counsel detailing a concern for the
conservatee’s capacity.198
All of these cases confirm that the petitioner or objector must act in good faith,
that is, acting in a manner that places the conservatee’s best interests above all
else.199 Furthermore, it is not enough to act in good faith belief, the party’s good
faith belief must also be objectively reasonable or reasonably prudent.200 Yet,
because there is no concrete rule governing when someone does or does not act
reasonable or in good faith, the determination is largely subjective and left to
judicial discretion.201
B. California Rules of Court “Reasonableness” Factors
Each court has a set of rules that govern the manner in which a court conducts
its business.202 “Each jurisdiction has its own procedure for how court rules are
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Conservatorship of Lefkowitz, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1316.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Conservatorship of Cornelius, 200 Cal. App. 4th 1198, 1206 (2011).
198. Id.
199. Conservatorship of Lefkowitz, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1314.
200. Id.
201. Jeffrey S. Galvin, California Courts May Scrutinize Conservator Fees, DOWNEY BRAND (Oct. 3,
2018), https://www.trustontrial.com/2018/10/california-courts-may-scrutinize-conservator-fees/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
202. Goodson Law Library, Court Rules, DUKE U., https://law.duke.edu/lib/research-guides/court-rules/
(last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
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promulgated, which is generally some combination of legislative or judicial
action.”203 Some courts may refer to its rules as either “rules of court” or “rules of
procedure.”204 Regardless of the terminology, the rules apply to various types of
courts and function as “internal operating procedures.” 205
The California Rules of Court are applicable to all courts within the state,
including probate courts.206 Rule 7.756 of the California Rules of Court details a
list of factors a judge may consider when deciding whether to award compensation
in conservatorship matters.207 The court in Conservatorship of Presha applied the
reasonableness factors when reviewing a conservator’s request for fee
compensation.208 The court reviewed the conservator’s bill and expressed concern
with a few of the charges.209 One particular expense signaled a red flag.210 The
court questioned why the conservator charged the conservatee’s estate to review a
bank statement just to confirm the bank had the conservator’s correct mailing
address.211 Yet, it was evident the bank did have her correct mailing address
because she received the bank statement to her home.212 There were many similar
billing expenses that appeared questionable and unwarranted, so the court
requested a review of the conservator’s billing practices. 213 The court found that
she charged eight different clients a total of 3.6 hours for what appeared to be one
trip to a bank.214 The court conceded that it was possible for her to have spent a
total of 3.6 hours at the bank and charged each of the clients their respective
proportional share of her time.215 However, there were multiple instances of this
behavior which convinced the court to reduce her fees. 216
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. CAL. RULE OF CT. 1.4 (West 2019).
207. See CAL. RULE OF CT. 7.756 (West 2019) (listing the following “standards for determining just and
reasonable compensation . . . (1) the size and nature of the conservatee’s or ward’s estate; (2) the benefit to the
conservatee or ward, or his or her estate, of the conservator’s or guardian’s services; (3) the necessity for the
services performed; (4) the conservatee’s or ward’s anticipate future needs and income; (5) the time spent by the
conservator or guardian in the performance of the services; (6) whether the services performed were routine or
required more than ordinary skill or judgment; (7) any unusual skill, expertise, or experience brought to the
performance of services; (8) the conservator’s or guardian’s estimate of the value of the services performed; and
(9) the compensation customarily allowed by the court in the community where the court is located for the
management of conservatorships or guardianships of similar size and complexity”).
208. Conservatorship of Presha, 26 Cal. App. 5th 487, 491 (2018).
209. Id.
210. See id. at 491 (describing the expense required to review a bank statement to confirm the bank had
her correct mailing address when it was evident that the bank did have her correct mailing address because the
letter was delivered to the conservator).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 490.
214. Conservatorship of Presha, 26 Cal. App. 5th at 492–93.
215. Id. at 493.
216. Id. at 494.
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On appeal, the appellate court applied the reasonableness factors outlined in
Rule 7.756.217 Factor number five, i.e., “the time spent by the conservator or
guardian in the performance of services,” was particularly helpful to the court.218
The court believed the conservator inaccurately reported her time as evidenced
from the above examples, so it reduced her fees accordingly.219 The court also used
factor number three, i.e., “the necessity for the services performed.” 220 The court
concluded that when it reviewed the bank statement and other miscellaneous
documents, there were many unnecessary expenses.221 Factor number eight, i.e.,
“the conservator’s or guardian’s estimate of the value of the services performed,”
was the final factor the court considered.222 The court concluded that many of the
conservator’s tasks were clerical in nature of which an office assistant could have
performed at a lower pay rate.” 223 As a result, the court believed that the
conservator overestimated the value of her services. 224
While the court still chose to compensate the conservator and her attorney, the
court reduced her fees by nearly 45%.225 Conservatorship of Presha serves as a
notice to conservators and private fiduciaries that a judge has the ultimate
discretion to determine what is just and reasonable under the law. 226 “A probate
judge, on his or her own initiative, may scrutinize and reduce the requested fees,
and may go so far as to examine the fiduciary’s billings submitted to courts in other
cases. As long as the judge has a reasonable bases for reducing [the] fees.” 227
V. MODEL RULE
In 2013, California Senator Jim Beall introduced Senate Bill 156 in an attempt
to place even more stringent restrictions on attorney fees in conservatorship
matters.228 The purpose of the bill was to prevent the conservatee’s estate from
having to pay litigation expenses when the court removed the conservator “for
cause” in a petition where the conservatee objected to the conservatorship. 229

217. Id. at 500.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Conservatorship of Presha, 26 Cal. App. 5th at 500.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 491.
224. Id.
225. Galvin, supra note 201.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See generally Hearing on SB 156 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 2013 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. 1 (Cal.
2013) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing a proposed amendment the existing
probate code whereby the losing party would pay the opposing party’s costs, including attorney’s fees, rather than
seek reimbursement from the conservatee’s estate, which reduces the judge’s discretion to award costs to the nonprevailing even if the non-prevailing party acted in the best interest of the conservatee).
229. See id. (highlighting a notable case where a San Jose man contested his own conservatorship and won,
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The bill introduced a “two-way fee shifting provision” whereby the losing
party pays.230 If the court reduced the conservator’s fees as a result of a petition
filed with the court, the court deemed the petitioner as the prevailing party and
charged her costs against any compensation the conservator received. 231 The
conservator would be personally liable for any unsatisfied amount.232 If, however,
the court does not reduce the conservator’s compensation, then the court presumes
the conservator is the prevailing party and the court may order the opposing party
to pay her own litigation expenses, as well as the expenses the conservator
incurs.233 Senate Bill 156 passed in both the Assembly and Senate, but eventually,
former Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the bill because he feared it would eliminate
the court’s discretion to award compensation as a judge should see fit. 234 Case law
similarly confirms the notion that the law must preserve judicial discretion due to
the fact that no concrete law exists to define when someone does or does not act
reasonably or in good faith.235 Instead, case law demands that this determination
rest solely with the judge.236
Judicial discretion is a cornerstone of law.237 When a judge renders a holding,
another judge is not inclined to overturn the lower court’s decision “unless an
abuse of discretion is plainly involved.”238 Governor Brown recognized the
significance of judicial discretion when he vetoed Senate Bill 156.239 The
Legislature drafted and passed Senate Bill 156 as an answer to when to award
attorney fees in a conservatorship matter as opposed to when a party should bear
its own costs.240 However, Governor Brown knew that if he voted to enact the bill,
it would directly limit a judge’s discretion for awarding attorney fees and he could

but the existing law required the judge to order the man to pay out nearly $150,000 in fees to the conservator’s
attorney who objected to the man’s petition to remove his own conservatorship).
230. See id. (interpreting the language of the bill infers the losing party pays because the court may hold
the non-prevailing party “personally liable to the guardianship or conservatorship estate for the amount ordered”
or “for any amount that remains unsatisfied”).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234.
SB-156 Conservatorships and Guardianships: Attorney Fees, CAL. LEGIS. INFO.,
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SB156 (last visited Jan. 10,
2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
235. Galvin, supra note 201.
236. Id.
237. See U.S. CONST. art. III (providing a branch of the government devoted to judicial power and
discretion).
238. In re Jacobson’s Guardianship, 30 Cal. 2d 312, 325 (1947).
239. SB-156 Conservatorships and Guardianships: Attorney Fees, supra note 234.
240. See id. (noting in the Legislative Counsel’s Digest that “[t]his bill would instead prohibit the guardian
or conservator from being compensated from the estate for any costs or fees, including attorney fees, incurred in
defending the compensation in the petition, if the court reduces or denies the compensation requested in the
petition”).
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not allow that to happen.241
The fact that the Legislature recently attempted to resolve the attorney fee issue
but failed means that another attempt at amending the probate code requires the
preservation of judicial discretion.242 As a result, this Comment proposes only
subtle amendments to the Probate Code and Rules of Court without sacrificing
judicial discretion.243 The model rule focuses on California Probate Code § 2640.1
and the Rules of Court’s reasonableness factors.244
Currently, California Probate Code § 2640.1 allows the petitioner to collect
her fees, including attorney fees, from the conservatee’s estate even if the court
appoints someone other than who the petitioner had requested the court to
appoint.245 For example, if the petitioner appoints herself to become the
conservator but the court appoints someone else, she can still request for the court
to have her fees paid out of the conservatee’s estate. 246 However, the same code
section does not permit the petitioner to collect her fees if she requests to appoint
someone other than herself and the court appoints that person to serve as
conservator.247 This omission in the probate code might encourage a petitioner to
appoint herself rather than a neutral third party out of fear of not being awarded
fee compensation.248
It might come as no surprise that when a son or daughter requests to appoint
themselves in a position to control a parent’s estate, the other siblings become
defensive.249 Eventually, each sibling competes to control the parent while
accusing the other sibling of wrongdoing.250 The judge becomes the family
counselor having to parse through the facts to decide which sibling is the good one
versus the bad one.251 The process can be adversarial and as a result each sibling
arms themselves with an attorney, causing the escalation in attorney fees to
begin—but this need not be the case. 252
The Legislature should amend California Probate Code § 2641.1 to allow the
court to award compensation to the petitioner and her attorney from the

241. Id.
242. See id. (highlighting the governor’s veto messages in which Governor Brown stated, “[t]his bill would
eliminate a court’s discretion to compensate a guardian or conservator from the conservatee’s estate for costs
incurred to defend a fee request if the court reduces the fee request by even a small amount”; therefore, Governor
Brown did not sign the bill because it limited judicial discretion).
243. Infra Part V.
244. Infra Part V.
245. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2640.1 (West 2019).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.; Galvin, supra note 43.
250. Galvin, supra note 28.
251. See Galvin, supra note 43 (stating that there tends to always be a “good” party and a “bad” party in
conservatorship cases, and so it is up to the judge to decide who is the respective party by parsing through the
family drama).
252. PROB. § 2640.1.
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conservatee’s estate in the event the petitioner requests to appoint a neutral third
party—even if the third party does not become the conservator or even if the court
does not impose a conservatorship on the proposed conservatee. 253 The point is
that when the petitioner seeks to appoint someone other than herself, she is
motivated to protect the parent’s best interest and not a self-interest to control the
parent and their estate. 254 This amendment would prevent the court from having to
determine which sibling is truly acting in the best interest of the parent. 255 Instead,
the court is simply inclined to appoint a neutral third party because the parent truly
needs help.256
Conversely, the Legislature should amend California Probate Code § 2641.1
to scrutinize any compensation requests from a petitioner who initially requests to
appoint herself, but the court did not appoint her or did not impose a
conservatorship.257 That is not to say that the petitioner should not be compensated
when she loses her case, but rather, the court should be more encouraged to apply
the Rules of Court’s reasonableness factors to determine whether her request was
truly in the best interest of the proposed conservatee. 258
In turn, the Legislature should also amend the Rules of Court’s reasonableness
factors to coincide with the above amendments to include a factor that gives
preference to neutral third-party appointments.259 A judge should consider the
appointment of a third party to be more reasonable and in good faith because there
is less evidence of self-interest.260 Conversely, a judge should be encouraged to
authorize fees to the party who opposes the petition if she recommends appointing
a neutral third party rather than defending her status as the conservator. 261
253. Id.; see supra Part V (highlighting a gap in the law in which a court can award attorney fees to a
petitioner in a who appoints herself as conservator even if the court does not ultimately appoint the petitioner as
the conservator, whereas, a court cannot award fees to a petition who appoints a third party to serve as conservator,
and the court does not appoint that third party).
254. See Conservatorship of Lefkowitz, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1310, 1316 (1996) (highlighting that the court
reduced the conservator’s fee compensation because she was motivated by self-interest and not the conservatee’s
best interests).
255. See Galvin, supra note 43 (stating that there tends to always be a “good” party and a “bad” party in
conservatorship cases, and so it is up to the judge to decide who is the respective party by parsing through the
family drama).
256. See id. (explaining that it can be easier for a court to appoint a third party to serve as a conservator
rather than parse through the family drama to determine who is the “good” versus “bad” party in the pending
conservatorship case).
257. See PROB. § 2640.1 (showing that the code is currently written to permit the court to award
compensation to the conservator regardless of whether she wins or loses so long as she appointed herself as the
conservator).
258. CAL. RULE OF CT. 7.756 (West 2019); see supra Part V (highlighting how the reasonableness factors
are a great tool for courts to use rather than awarding fees outright).
259. RULE OF CT. 7.756; see supra Part V (noting the gap in existing law that restricts courts from awarding
fees to a petitioner who initially petitions for a third party to serve as conservator rather than the petitioner herself,
which lends itself to starting conflict among family).
260. Galvin, supra note 43.
261. Id.
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Additionally, the Legislature should amend the Rules of Court to appoint a
guardian ad litem or a similar party as opposed to or in addition to the courtappointed counsel.262 The guardian ad litem could act in the best interest of the
conservatee rather than be required to zealously represent the conservatee’s
wishes.263 Therefore, the guardian ad litem could paint a realistic portrait of what
is truly going on in the case. 264
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of a conservatorship is to fight to protect the conservatee’s
interests rather than to gain control over the conservatee. 265 The goal of the
proposed amendments presented in this Comment is to promote a return to this
mindset by encouraging more judicial discretion when reviewing petitions for fee
compensation, while at the same time giving preference to parties who are truly
acting in the best interest of the conservatee.266 The hope is that these amendments
promote safeguarding the elderly and infirm, which is the essence of a
conservatorship.267
If the Legislature adopted the aforementioned amendments today, and the
court applied them to the case of Doe, the judge would then approach fee request
petitions with more skepticism than previously.268 Because neither Darla nor
Steven petitioned for the court to appoint a neutral third party, the judge should
apply the amended reasonableness factors to determine whether either party was
acting in Doe’s best interest or whether either was motivated by an interest to oust
the other sibling.269 Additionally, the guardian ad litem could report to the court
that the case is dragging on due to a sibling rivalry and not due to whether Doe
needs a conservatorship.270 As a result, the judge would hopefully be more inclined

262. CAL. RULE OF CT. 7.1101 (West 2019); Galvin, supra note 77.
263. RULE OF CT. 7.1101; Galvin, supra note 77; Ikemire, supra note 11.
264. See Galvin, supra note 77 (stating that the guardian ad litem “would investigate the situation, assess
the conservatee’s interests, and report that assessment to the court . . . Appointment of a [guardian ad litem] would
ensure that the judge hears two distinctive perspectives on the imposition and terms of the conservatorship: one
from the court appointed counsel who focuses on the client’s expressed preferences and the other from the
[guardian ad litem] who focuses on the clients best interests and who can report freely on communications with
interested parties”).
265. See Galvin, supra note 43 (stating that the purpose of a conservatorship is to protect the conservatee’s
interests and gain control over their assets).
266. Supra Part V.
267. Fields et al., supra note 107.
268. See supra Part V (noting how in Conservatorship of Presha the court used the reasonableness factors
to parse through fraudulent billings to conclude that it should only award half of the conservatorship fees, which
is an approach more courts should adopt).
269. See supra Part V (explaining how the reasonableness factors could be amended to encompass
additional factors not yet enumerated).
270. See supra Part I (detailing how guardian ad litems are necessary to represent the true best interests of
the conservatee rather than a court-appointed counselor who faces a conflict between representing the
conservatee’s best interest versus their desired outcome).
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to require each party to pay their own attorney fees because neither is acting in
Doe’s best interest as they drag out the litigation.271

271. See supra Part I (explaining how a guardian ad litem would be able to tell the court that the on-going
litigation is the result of feuding siblings and nothing else, so they should pay their respective fees because they
are not acting in their mother’s best interest).
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